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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the formation process of accounting institutions 
and the possibilities that exist for them to evolve. In this paper, accounting is considered an 
“institution” and the discussion is based on the concept and approach of comparative 
institutional analysis (CIA)1. In addition to accounting standards, this investigation also 
looks at the rules—in a broader sense—that regulate company actions. While I will use U.S. 
examples, I will also refer to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and 
Japanese cases where necessary. 
This investigation is primarily based on the following two questions. First, in recent 
years, why have we so often observed the setting of accounting rules that are not in keeping 
with the empirical evidence demonstrated in “archival studies”?2 (Research Question 1) 
Second, if these accounting rules are not based on facts that have been demonstrated in the 
form of empirical evidence, then what has determined this rulemaking? (Research Question 
2) In the following sections, I will attempt to answer these two questions. It is hoped that 
this investigation will lead to an explanation of the patterns behind the changes in 
accounting institutions.   
In this paper, the term “practice” is used in the broad sense—at the macro level (the 
level of standard-setting) as well as at the micro level (the level of individual companies). 
The reason is that this investigation also necessitates the consideration of the social raison 
d’être of accounting research that can be achieved through a comparison with practice in the 
broad sense. 
 
2. Identifying the basic facts: situating archival studies within accounting research 
 
First, I will identify the basic facts. Table 1 shows the types of papers that have been 
 2 
published in three main accounting journals (Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting 
Research, and Journal of Accounting and Economics) over the five-year period 2001–2005. 
As we can see, 481 articles were published in these journals during this period, of which 
344 (71.5%) were archival studies. As shown in Table 1, a (a) value relevance analysis is a 
study that tests the correlation between accounting and other company information and 
market indicators (investment return, stock prices, etc.) (i.e., the value relevance of 
information) and corresponds to Suda’s (2000, chapter 6) “archival study oriented towards 
an analysis of the support functions for decision-making.” On the other hand, (b) agency 
cost analysis is a study based on a research design involving hypothesis-testing, which is 
informed by agency theory that investigates the causal relationship between accounting and 
other company information and the actions of economic agents, and corresponds to Suda’s 
(2000, chapter 3) “archival study oriented towards an analysis of the contract-support 
functions.” All other types of archival studies are classified as (c) “other empirical 
analyses”. 
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Source: Compiled based on studies published in each journal from 2001 – 2005. 
 
All of the studies that do not belong under (a) to (c) are classified as “3. Others.” The 
main research in this category comprises theoretical studies based on mathematical models 
(67 studies) and research informed by experimental accounting (56 studies). 
This constitutes merely a broad overview of the papers published in the three main 
accounting journals over this five-year period. It was difficult to classify some of the papers 
solely into one category; the results shown in Table 1 are therefore not to be considered 
absolute. Yet, in spite of such limitations, we can at least see that it is an undisputable fact 
that archival studies have become an important trend in accounting research. This is also 
consistent with recent developments in accounting research in Japan. In other words, 
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archival studies now constitute such an overwhelming trend in accounting research that it is 
not possible to omit their existence when discussing the significance of accounting research. 
Thus, if we consider that the findings of archival studies are almost never reflected in 
accounting rulemaking, this leads us to question the actual raison d’être of accounting 
research in society. In this sense, it is hoped that the discussion that follows will also enable 
us to re-question the raison d’être of accounting research. 
 
3. Empirical evidence and rulemaking 
 
In recent years—specifically, since the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
was established in 1973—we have so often observed accounting rulemaking that is not in 
keeping with the empirical evidence demonstrated in archival studies. In this section, I 
would like to confirm this by referring to the following three topics: (1) cash flow vs. 
accounting profit, (2) comprehensive income vs. net income, and (3) auditor independence. 
Topics (1) and (2) call into question the significance of the traditional concept of profit (net 
income), while topic (3) questions the significance of the company auditor: these have 
become important points of discussion and contention in the realm of rulemaking in recent 
years.  
 
3.1. Cash flow vs. accounting profit 
 
The FASB’s Concepts Statements stipulated that “information about enterprise earnings 
and its components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better indication 
of enterprise performance than information about current cash receipts and payments” 
(SFAC, No. 1, para. 44) and positioned cash flow during the period as one of the important 
pieces of information (or at least complementary accounting information) that should be 
included in financial statements (SFAC, No. 5, para. 13). U.S. standards relating to cash 
flow statements (FAS95, 1987) can said to have been established as an extension of this 
positioning.  
From the late 1980s through to the 1990s, phrases such as “cash is king” (Copeland et al. 
1990, p. 73) and “cash is fact, and accounting profit is opinion” (Wei, 2002) became very 
popular particularly in the field of corporate valuation. Accounting profit included accruals 
that reflected the manager’s intent through their choice of or change in accounting policies. 
By contrast, since cash flow did not include this kind of bias, the basic argument behind 
these phrases was that cash flow information was therefore more useful than accounting 
profit information for investment decision-making purposes. These ideas also spilled over 
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into the design of accounting systems, with, for example, the IAS7 (revised in 1992) citing 
that “[information about cash flow] also allows comparison of information about the 
performance of the operation of different companies as it eliminates the effects of using 
different accounting treatments for the same transactions and economic events” (para. 4) as 
one of the “benefits of information on cash flow”. Other countries in succession, 
recognizing the importance of these arguments, proceeded to set their own accounting 
standards related to cash flow statements (Japanese standards were set in 1998), and the 
cash flow statement evolved globally into the “third financial statement.”  
 
Table 2. Archival studies reporting relatively higher value relevance of accounting profit 






US market Other markets 
Return Dechow (1994); Biddle et al. 
(1995); Biddle et al. (1997); 
Subramanyam (1996); Quirin et 
al. (1999); Guay and Sidhu (2001); 
Moehrile et al. (2001); Callen and 
Segl (2004) 
Board and Day (1989) (UK); Cotter 
(1996) (Au); Charitou et al. (2001) 
(UK); Haw et al. (2001) (C); Uchida 
(2000) (Jp) 
Stock Price Penman and Sougiannis (1998); 
Francis et al. (2000) 
Sakurai (1992) (Jp); Fujii and 
Yamamoto (2001) (Jp); Wakabayashi 
(2014) (Jp) 
Note: The letters in brackets indicate the country: Au = Australia, C = China, Jp = 
Japan, UK = UK.  
 
Although archival studies in Japan and overseas that investigated the comparative 
advantages of the value of cash flow versus accounting profit information (categorized in 
Table 1 under (a) value relevance analysis) recognized the incremental information value of 
cash flow information, almost all studies presented empirical evidence demonstrating the 
relatively higher value relevance of accounting profit information. That is, archival studies 
consistently reported that, in terms of value relevance, the “king” is accounting profit 




3.2. Comprehensive income vs. net income 
 
The traditional concept of accounting profit has also been criticized from the 
asset/liability view3. The fundamental point behind this criticism is that net income, which 
is based on the allocation of cash flow, is prone to distortion by a manager’s latitude, 
whereas comprehensive income is based on stock valuation and therefore constitutes clear 
and objective information. Papers arguing for the necessity of adopting this perspective in 
standard-setting were published in particularly high numbers during the late 1990s through 
to the early 2000s. The G4+1 Group (1989, 1999) and the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) (2001) were considered representative of this trend. They 
argued for a rejection of realization as recognition criteria in accounting and the prohibition 
of the recycling of other comprehensive income. In other words, they wanted to see net 
income excluded from performance reporting and the concept of profit consolidated as 
comprehensive income. The Joint Working Group (JWG) (2001) argued for full fair value 
accounting of financial assets and liabilities as well as the recognition of changes in fair 
value as gains and loss. If recycling was prohibited, the JWG (2001) also argued in line with 
the G4+1 Group (1989, 1999) and IASC (2001) for a return to the exclusion of net income 
from performance reporting (i.e. a single statement of comprehensive income). Furthermore, 
the Joint Project of Financial Performance Reporting by Business Enterprises that was 
launched in 2004 by the FASB and IASB set out the consolidation of the concept of profit 
as comprehensive income (i.e., excluding net income from performance reporting) as an 
option for accounting systems (FASB, 2005b).  
 
Table 3. Archival studies reporting relatively higher value relevance of net income than 
comparative income information 
US market Other markets 
Cheng et al. (1993); Dhaliwal et al. (1999) O’Hanlon and Rope (1999) (UK); Cahan et 
al. (2000) (NZ); Kubota et al. (2005) (Jp); 
Usui (2005) (Jp) 
Notes:  
1. The explained variable in all studies was return. 
2. NZ = New Zealand. All other country codes are the same as Table 2. 
 
Yet, almost all archival studies in Japan and overseas that had investigated the 
comparative advantages of the value of comprehensive income versus net income 
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information (categorized in Table 1 under (a) value relevance analysis) presented empirical 
evidence demonstrating that comprehensive income did not have more value relevance than 
net income. Table 3 shows representative studies. 
What has particularly come to the fore on this topic is that, regardless of the fact that 
archival studies have repeatedly shown that the empirical evidence does not prove 
comprehensive income to be more value-relevant than net income, there have been 
persistent assertions in the realm of standard-setting for net income to be excluded from 
performance reporting; that is, for profit to be consolidated as comprehensive income. 
Supposing that such assertions were reflected in standard-setting, this would mean that the 
information actually considered more value-relevant—net income—would be excluded 
from the disclosed information. The previous section addressed the issue of cash flow vs. 
accounting profit. Here, the discrepancy between the findings of archival studies and 
practice basically comes down to an issue of interpretation, that is, which of the two is to be 
emphasized. With regard to comprehensive income vs. net income, however, this 
discrepancy is more than simply an issue of interpretation; this could amount to a very real 
problem in standard-setting that affects the very nature of accounting systems, not to 
mention their core constituent of how profit is measured. The nature of this discrepancy is 
therefore considered more serious than the former issue.   
 
3.3. Auditor independence 
 
Auditing today operates under a system of dual responsibility whereby responsibilities 
are clearly delineated into drawing up financial statements (the company’s responsibility) 
and giving an opinion on whether the financial statements are presented fairly (the auditor’s 
responsibility). The most important element underpinning this principle is auditor 
independence. Thus, until now, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) main role 
vis-á-vis professional accountants has centered on ensuring compliance with auditor 
independence requirements.  
One of the main factors that the SEC has considered as impeding auditor independence 
has been an auditor providing audit and non-audit services to the same company. This is 
because it was thought that the provision of non-audit services, such as consulting or tax 
services, generates a conflict of interests, which can have a negative impact on auditor 
independence. From the late 1990s onwards, this view informed the SEC’s efforts to 
gradually expand regulations on non-audit services. However, the most decisive 
development came with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsequently, “SOX”), which 
markedly strengthened regulations on the provision of non-audit services. Under SOX, an 
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auditor is prohibited from carrying out the following nine non-audit services (Sec. 201): (1) 
bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of 
the audit client; (2) financial information systems design and implementation; (3) appraisal 
or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial 
services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human 
resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; (8) legal 
services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and (9) any other services that the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible. Thus, 
the provision of non-audit services by an auditor, particularly consulting services, was in 
effect positioned as an illegal activity. 
However, the empirical evidence presented by almost all archival studies carried out in 
Japan and overseas for the causal relationship between non-audit services and auditor 
independence (categorized in Table 1 under (b) agency cost analysis; see left-hand column 
in Table 44) demonstrated no statistically significant relationship between the performance 
of non-audit services (e.g., the relative amount of remuneration gained from non-audit 
services) and auditor independence (e.g., the auditor’s opinion on financial statements with 
abnormal accruals). In other words, almost all archival studies continuously reported that a 
systematic dependency of the auditor on the client company—problematized by the SEC 
and parliament—had not been observed. 
 
Table 4. Archival studies reporting no systematic dependency of auditor on client company 
Studies verifying auditor independence Studies verifying Elite Domination 
Hypothesis 
Simunic (1984); Craswell et al. (2002); 
DeFond et al. (2002); Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003); Chung et al. (2003); Larcker et al. 
(2004); Matsumoto (2004) 
Haring (1979); Hussein and Ketz (1980); 
Brown (1981); Puro (1985); Mckee (1991) 
Note: All studies refer to the US. 
 
These findings also correlate with a series of archival studies carried out to verify 
whether the criticism of the “accounting establishment” is appropriate or not (right-hand 
column of Table 4). The “accounting establishment” is a term used by the Metcalf 
Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate in its 1997 report (commonly known as the “Metcalf 
report”). The report criticized the “Big Eight” group of accounting firms5, as they were then 
known, for (self-interestedly) setting—through the FASB, a body that is completely under 
their control—the very accounting standards with which they themselves have to comply 
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and which they apply in accordance with their client companies’ wishes (Tsumori, 2002, 
pp. 297-298). The system setting the standards was termed the “accounting establishment.” 
However, a set of archival studies that investigated whether the views of a specific group 
were at the core of standard-setting preferences (the “elite domination” hypothesis) 
uniformly rejected this hypothesis. They also presented empirical evidence to show that it 
could not be said that the views of the Big Eight were controlled by the preferences of their 
client companies (nor, therefore, that the client companies were indirectly controlling the 
FASB). 
Here it should be added that SOX prohibited auditors from auditing the same company 
for more than five years because it had been judged that auditing the same company over 
the long term generates a cozy relationship between the client company and the auditor, 
which would have a negative impact on auditor independence (Sec. 203). However, Myers 
et al. (2003) actually reported a positive correlation between the auditor’s length of service 
and quality of earnings when abnormal accruals or current accruals were used as a proxy. 
Similarly, Ghosh and Moon (2005) reported a positive correlation between the quality of 
earnings when earnings response coefficients were used as a proxy, the quality of auditing 
when the influence of reported earnings on stock ranking was used as a proxy, and the 
auditor’s length of service. In other words, these archival studies presented empirical 
evidence that the quality of earnings and of the auditing itself improves with the length of 
service. These findings show that the aforementioned prohibition set out in Sec. 203 of 
SOX is not empirically supported. 
 
4. Features of rulemaking and basic patterns 
 
4.1. What has determined rulemaking? 
 
The previous section (re)confirmed that accounting rulemaking in recent years has often 
not been in keeping with the empirical evidence demonstrated by archival studies. However, 
we do at least need to bear in mind the following two points. 
First, the fact that archival studies are carried out ex post. Archival studies investigate 
the nature of information (its value relevance or causal relationship with the actions of 
economic agents), but this can only be demonstrated after the rule in question has actually 
been set (Saito, 2005, p. 11). In other words, aside from revising or repealing existing rules 
or setting rules within the framework of the international convergence of accounting 
standards, which gives access to the experiences of other countries as a “happened future” 
(Ito, 1996, p. 3), it is technically impossible to implement rulemaking based on the results 
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of archival studies. It goes without saying then that complete conformity between a rule that 
has already been set (the measure) and the empirical evidence that has come to light after 
the event (the result) is not something that we could realistically hope to see. 
The second point is the bias in regulation that is generated through the asymmetric loss 
function (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, pp. 229-230). The economic scale of phenomena 
triggering regulatory change is generally large (for example, Enron’s off-balance sheet 
liabilities amounted to approximately 27 billion U.S. dollars, and WorldCom’s total 
liabilities amounted to approximately 30 billion U.S. dollars), and they tend to attract a lot 
of public attention. Therefore, all other things being equal, implementing strong regulations 
focused on the phenomenon in question entails a relatively lower political cost for the 
regulator (e.g., the risk of being held politically accountable afterwards for a regulatory 
failure) when compared with not doing so. In other words, in terms of statistical probability, 
the incentive to enforce strong regulations aimed at prominent cases that have a high 
possibility of becoming outliers has always existed in the political process.  
Nevertheless, what is important to stress here is that the inconsistency between 
rulemaking and empirical evidence is too pronounced to be explained by these two points. 
What is more, all of the cases demonstrate consistent trends. Of course, archival studies 
cannot always be said to provide an accurate interpretation of all the facts relating to 
accounting issues. However, in the field of accounting research, there are no signs that an 
alternative scientific fact-finding method will be developed to replace archival studies in the 
foreseeable future. For the time being at least then, it is acceptable to see the empirical 
evidence presented by these archival studies relating to each of the accounting issues with 
which they deal as scientific fact. In the rest of this paper, the term “fact” will be used in 
this sense, unless specified otherwise.  
As I have repeatedly shown so far, accounting rulemaking in recent years has often not 
been in keeping with the empirical evidence demonstrated in archival studies. Even though 
it should have been possible to set rules based on empirical evidence (at least to a certain 
extent) in cases involving a revision or repeal of existing rules or within the framework of 
the international convergence of accounting standards, we saw in the previous section that 
besides rulemaking with regard to topic 3.2 (comprehensive income vs. net income) and 
topic 3.3 (auditor independence) simply being inconsistent with the relevant empirical 
evidence, proposals were intermittently put forward that either contradicted or conflicted 
with empirical evidence, and under SOX, rules were actually set in accordance with these 
proposals. Even in the U.S.—where archival studies are most widely used—FAS33, 
Financial Reporting and Changing Prices (effectively abolished in 1986) has been virtually 
the only exception of a revision or repeal of an existing rule being carried out in accordance 
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with empirical evidence, and this remains so to this day. 
In this sense, we can say that recent rulemaking has basically not been implemented 
based on fact. In the social sciences, a transcendental (and thus unfalsifiable) factor that 
does not depend on fact is known as a “belief.” If we posit that it was this kind of 
transcendental factor that has determined rulemaking in recent years, this means that it can 
only be belief. This now enables us to answer Research Question 2, set out at the start of 
this paper. 
The beliefs of the rulemakers (particularly the FASB and the IASB) stood like a wall in 
the way of the empirical evidence, preventing the findings of archival studies being applied 
to rulemaking (see Figure 1). The only thing that can pass through the wall of belief is 
empirical evidence that is consistent with the belief. Facts are powerless in the face of belief. 
Statements by archival researchers, for example, that it is not possible to design effective 
policies without in-depth knowledge of the real world (Okabe, 1985, p. 18) or that 
constructive arguments based on evidence from archival studies lead to the creation of more 
appropriate disclosure systems (Suda (ed.) 2004, p. i), have not shown any signs of reaching 
the ears of the rulemakers, or at least not yet.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between empirical evidence and rulemaking 
 










As was shown in Table 1, archival studies constitute an overwhelming trend in 
accounting research. From a quantitative perspective, therefore, it is safe to say that archival 
studies have already been established as a legitimate form of accounting research. As a 
demonstrative method, too, they are undergoing remarkable qualitative developments every 
day. Irrespective of this, if the findings of archival studies are consistently failing to reach 
the realm of rulemaking, then this can even lead us to the paradoxical interpretation that 
their popularity and refined techniques are actually only proof of their essential uselessness 
Rule-making 
Evidence 1 Evidence 2 Evidence n 
Rule-making 
Evidence 1 Evidence 2 Evidence n 
Wall of belief 
Only empirical evidence consistent 
with a certain belief can pass 
through the wall. 
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and powerlessness.  
 
4.2. The significance of rulemaking derived from belief 
 
If the rules were determined by the beliefs of those who set them, this raises a new 
question: In such a strongly market-oriented U.S., why were non-market—in the sense that 
they did not conform to market facts (including the auditing-service market)—rules set? If 
they were determined by beliefs that did not fit with market facts, there must have been 
some kind of social significance and rationality for this to have been maintained almost 
consistently for more than a quarter of a century. 
Yano (2005) provides a useful viewpoint for thinking about this problem. Yano (2005, 
p. 16) argued that the 20th century was a time when rules were implemented to protect the 
market in order to secure the quality of competition and information. If we consider the case 
of the U.S., and adding my own interpretation, I would summarize the gist of what Yano 
(2005) was arguing as follows. 
During the Industrial Revolution, discontinuous technological innovation (improving 
product quality) led the way, and the quality of competition and information, unable to 
catch up, fell out of balance with the technology and declined. Since there was the risk that 
the market itself would collapse if this state of imbalance was not addressed, rules were 
implemented to circumvent such a situation. For example, during the First Industrial 
Revolution (when industrial capitalism was established in the 19th century), in order to 
circumvent the risk of the labor market collapsing as a result of the considerable power 
imbalance between the workforce and management, a whole range of social welfare rules 
were established (e.g., the Act from 1840 to 1860, which stipulated a 10-hour working day). 
During the Second Industrial Revolution (when financial capitalism was established at the 
beginning of the 20th century), in order to circumvent the risk of a capital market collapse as 
a result of crashing stock prices, the Securities Acts (1933 and 1934) were enforced with the 
aim of restoring order and stability to the market. During the Third Industrial Revolution 
(when the new economies emerged at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 
21st century), in order to address the negative impact on the market of the risky business 
practices of the new economies and the associated accounting scandals (loss of public trust 
in accounting), SOX was enacted with the aim of strengthening corporate ethics and 
accountability. 
If we relate these points to the issues under investigation in this paper, we can say that 
rulemaking in the U.S. was determined by the U.S. belief in “protecting the markets.” M.G. 
Oxley, one of the men involved in drafting SOX, said in the report submitted to the House 
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of Representatives: “[t]his legislation responds to the problems of the marketplace through a 
fair and balanced approach that ensures that the Nation’s capital markets continue to be the 
strongest in the world” (House of Representatives, 2002, p. 19). The idea that the U.S. 
markets are “the strongest in the world” was anecdotally widespread. Yet there was no 
explanation offered concerning fundamental points such as the standards against which the 
U.S. markets are being measured when they are judged to be “the strongest in the world”; 
and why the U.S. markets always need to continue to be “the strongest in the world.” M.G. 
Oxley’s above-mentioned statement bears extremely eloquent testimony to how self-evident 
and important a mission protecting the markets was for U.S. rulemakers. 
This then leads us to the tentative conclusion that protecting the markets was the U.S. 
belief, and that, consequently, the essence of the rules to protect the markets was rooted in 
protecting this U.S. belief6. That is, we can now put forward an answer to Research 
Question 1.   
S.A. Zeff, who has written about the development of accounting regulations in the U.S., 
stated as follows: “[a] study of the U.S. experience suggests that the academic literature has 
had remarkably little impact on the writings of practitioners and upon the accounting 
policies of the American Institute and the SEC. Too often, accounting theory is invoked 
more as a tactic to buttress one’s preconceived notions, rather than as a genuine arbiter of 
contending views” (Zeff, 1974, p. 177)7.   
From a Japanese perspective, the best strategy continues to be maintaining the 
legitimacy of their presence on the international markets by ensuring that domestic rules 
resemble American ones in an isomorphic way8. Strategies such as efforts regarding the 
international convergence of accounting standards, requiring representatives of listed 
companies to submit a written oath (implemented from January 2005 onwards on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange) and prohibiting auditors from auditing the same company for more than 
seven accounting periods (Article 24(3) of the revised Certified Public Accountants Act, 
2004)9 are typical cases of this kind of isomorphism that have been seen in recent years. 
Isomorphism of economic systems and corporate governance, too, will be something that 
occurs at around the same time. 
 
 
5. Indirect approach to belief formation mechanisms  
 
I believe that the investigation thus far has enabled me to provide an answer of sorts to 
the two research questions outlined at the beginning of the paper. However, we are aware 
that this constitutes no more than a preparatory investigation for clarifying the formation 
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process of accounting systems and possibilities for their evolution. That is, thus far we have 
been able to show that the main factor determining accounting rulemaking in recent years 
has been the belief of U.S. rulemakers in protecting the markets. However, in order to build 
on this and clarify the formation process of accounting institutions and possibilities for their 
evolution, there is another issue that we must address: we need to understand the 
mechanism behind the formation of this belief. If we avoid this task, our investigation will 
be nothing more than a superficial analysis of the rule-formation process. In this section, I 
would like to expand on the investigation to include a more in-depth study of the 
mechanism behind the formation of this belief. 
 
5.1. Infinite regression in discussion of mechanism behind belief formation 
 
What determined rulemaking (particularly in the case of the U.S.) was the rulemakers’ 
belief that overrode the empirical evidence. By what mechanism, then, was such a 
belief—that could override empirical evidence—formed? 
Belief must be connected in some form to reality since it is applied in the real world as 
the ultimate code of conduct for economic agents. Therefore, belief can be considered to 
have emerged from reality. However, if we try to directly explain the formation process of 
belief based on the supposition that it emerges from reality, we face the problem of infinite 
regression.   
Let us return to the argument in section 4.1. Here, we now need to substitute “fact” with 
“assertion” (a statement concerning a fact). This is because in asserting that a belief is fact, 
there is no guarantee that this is a fact in the scientific sense. What we can observe is “fact” 
in the sense of “asserting as fact something that one believes is fact.”   
In light of the above points, we can reformulate the conclusion in 4.1 as follows: an 
assertion can pass through the wall of belief and become a new component of that belief if 
the assertion conforms to a given belief. An assertion that does not conform to the belief is 
obstructed by the wall of belief and excluded from the belief formation process. If this is so, 
the next question that we need to answer is: Through what process is a given belief that 
fulfills the screening function in this process formed? This is because depending on the 
trajectory of a given belief, this will determine whether an assertion passes through the wall 
of belief or not. This means that in order to demonstrate the formation process of a belief 
(B1), we need to look further back and clarify the formation process of a given belief (B2) 
that is already part of this process. The same applies to belief (B3) that lies even further back 
in the process. Thus, in trying to understand the formation process of a belief, we face the 
problem of infinite regression: understand B1→ understand B2→ understand B3→…→ 
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understand B∞ (see Figure 2)10. 
 
Figure 2. Infinite regression discussed as the mechanism behind belief formation 
 
                  Assertion1               B1 
                                                            
 
Assertion2               B2 
 
 




Assertion∞            B∞ 
 
 
In order to circumvent this infinite regression, I would like to discuss in the following 
section the type of assertion that fits with a given belief and why it does so. By looking at 
the mechanism by which specific assertions pass through the wall of belief, I hope to be 
able to indirectly approach the mechanism behind the formation of belief.   
 
5.2. Clear and simple assertions and citizens’ bounded rationality 
 
Based on the discussion in section 4, we can categorize the types of assertions that fit 
with beliefs by the greatest common denominator in order to identify the following two 
assertions. First, we should separate accounting procedure from managers’ intent as far as 
possible and faithfully reflect the company’s economic reality in the accounting information. 
Second, all market participants need to be mutually independent and have a strong sense of 
morality. Both constitute clear and simple assertions that are intuitive and easy to 
understand. 
The rationale behind the first assertion is that the comparative advantages of cash flow 
over accounting profit have been emphasized (Copeland et al. 1990) and the introduction of 
full fair value accounting of financial assets and liabilities (JWG, 2001) and the 
consolidation of profit as comprehensive income (G4+1 Group, 1989; IASC, 2001) have 





auditors were prohibited in principle from providing non-audit services (Sec. 201) and from 
auditing the same company for more than five years (Sec. 203), and the burden of proof was 
placed on the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) regarding 
the fair presentation of financial statements (Sec. 302 and Sec. 906). In terms of primarily 
pursuing uniformity and external clarity of regulation, these assertions and measures go 
hand in hand.  
Why, then, do clear and simple assertions such as these—that are not derived from fact 
(or rather, are in conflict with fact)—fit with belief? 
Gaining a scientific understanding of certain questions entails extensive information 
costs, including the cost of acquiring specialist knowledge—for example, questions such as 
“What kinds of factors have taken what kind of path to generate an accounting scandal? and 
“What kind of cost–benefit relationship is acceptable with regard to regulation? The average 
citizen (a different form of existence to the kind of rational market participants tacitly 
supposed in the previous section = the public) does not have any incentive to bear those 
kinds of costs; furthermore, all the average citizen has is “bounded rationality.”11 However, 
what citizens do know is that some kind of new rule is necessary to circumvent a 
malfunction or collapse of the market. 
For such citizens, the aforementioned naïve and intuitive assertions are a lot more likely 
to be acceptable than scientific assertions, as long as they do not entail obvious 
contradictions or immediate factual errors. Further, as these naïve and intuitive assertions 
proceed to permeate society, they come to function as self-enforcing norms for micro 
economic agents, even if they are less rational than fact. A. Downs’s theory on the rational 
ignorance of citizens is in operation12. In such a situation, the fate for the academics who 
devote themselves to scientific assertions is social isolation.  
In summary, I have argued that assertions that fit with belief function as an intermediary 
for the belief to develop into a social rule; at the same time, the assertion itself gradually 
transforms into part of the belief through this process.  
 
5.3. A more general explanation based on CIA 
 
In CIA, an institution is something that arises when people strategically interact in 
domains such as politics, economics, society, and organizations to become a self-enforcing 
rule that each and everybody accepts as a given (Aoki, 2002). Under CIA, the process of a 
norm becoming a rule can also be understood as “institutionalization.” If we reframe the 
belief formation mechanism outlined above more generally from the point of view of CIA, 
we would come up with the following. 
 16
When a system becomes too complicated, the only people who understand its scientific 
mechanisms are the specialists directly involved in designing and operating it. Nonetheless, 
its functions penetrate to all corners of society and the system becomes an essential element 
of people’s everyday lives. In such a case, people are forced to find a way to understand the 
system; they would not be able to enjoy a stable coexistence with it otherwise. However, 
information-cost restrictions mean that people do not have sufficient incentives to try to 
understand it in scientific terms. At the same time, all they have is bounded rationality. In 
such a situation, people turn to clear and simple assertions, since this enables them to 
significantly reduce their information costs and the strain on their imagination. As a result, 
they remain ignorant to the scientific significance of the mechanism, but they succeed in 
coexisting with the system. Further, when the assertion that has gained acceptance through 
this process takes hold throughout society, it becomes an institution, which enables people 
to enjoy a stable coexistence with the system. 
There are two prerequisites for an assertion to become an institution in this way: 1) the 
main functions of the system must not be failing, at least for the time being; and 2) an 
intuitive explanation for it must exist. There is usually more than one assertion that meets 
these requirements. When people in a given society—the micro economic 
agents—repeatedly strategically interact on a daily basis, “strategic complementarity”13 
determines that they will go with the relatively superior assertion. This enables people to 
gain the maximum benefit. We can demonstrate this process of achieving balance as a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium in a random match game14 played out in accordance with the 
payoff matrix shown in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5           
 Assertion A Assertion B 
Assertion A 1,1 0,0 
Assertion B 0,0 1,1 
 
Table 5 shows that Assertion A and Assertion B both meet the aforementioned 
requirements. In terms of how much they will contribute to people’s lives, there is very little 
difference between the two. However, unless all people choose the same assertion, they will 
not be able to gain any benefits. In a society where different assertions exist in parallel (i.e., 
a society where an understanding different to your own exists in parallel), people do not feel 
confident in using the system in question. If we say that in such a society, the proportion of 
people choosing Assertion A is p and the proportion of people choosing Assertion B is 1－p, 
the payoff a person can expect to receive when choosing Assertion A is p and the payoff a 
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person can expect to receive when choosing Assertion B is 1－p. It follows therefore that 
the best choice for people is Assertion A when p > 1/2, Assertion A or Assertion B when p = 
1/2, and Assertion B when p < 1/2. As this game is repeated throughout society, p converges 
at 0 or 1. In other words, either Assertion A or Assertion B takes hold as the stable 
institution (i.e. a Nash equilibrium15). 
What we need to bear in mind here is that regardless of the choice of which assertion 
becomes a Nash equilibrium, that assertion does not necessarily constitute a scientific 
explanation of the facts relating to the system. It is only a statement that people have chosen 
because of their psychological understanding of the system (a subjective and intuitive 
understanding). The key point is that a psychological understanding of a given system is 
established in society by means of strategic interaction between people.  
 
6. Possibilities for institutional evolution in accounting  
 
6.1. The U.S. belief and institutional evolution  
 
Our investigation thus far has brought us to the understanding that rulemaking not in 
keeping with empirical evidence has been determined by the U.S. belief in protecting the 
markets. In light of this, we discussed the mechanism behind the formation of a belief that 
can override empirical evidence, based on the concept and approach of CIA. As a result, we 
have been able to demonstrate by using logical analysis that among the assertions that fit 
with the belief in protecting the markets and meet certain requirements, one assertion is 
established as an institution (a social rule) through the strategic actions of micro economic 
agents, citizens. We can take this further and say that changes in the game situation will also 
engender changes to the institution associated with the game’s equilibrium. This is where 
the possibilities for institutional evolution in accounting are concealed. 
As we have seen in section 4.2, the U.S. belief in protecting the markets can be 
considered an element that has penetrated history. If this belief is a given, I would like to 
investigate the kind of institutional evolution that can be observed when the game situation 
changes. The discussion below will be informed by evolutionary game theory (EGT). 
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) differs from classical game theory in that it supposes a 
world of bounded rationality composed of elements such as: (1) a single society where 
multiple players exist; (2) these players encounter each other randomly and have no 
memory of encounters with specific players (i.e. all each player knows is how strategies are 
distributed throughout the society as a whole, and they determine their own strategy based 
only on this knowledge); and (3) “inertia” and “myopia.” EGT is therefore very useful for 
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analyzing the kind of conventions and rules that come to exist in a society and how they 
change (Okuno and Takizawa, 1996, p. 277)16. 
  
6.2. Description of evolutionary mechanisms based on EGT 
 
I would like to start by describing the mechanisms for institutional evolution based on 
EGT17. Let us say that the standard game that players in a society are faced with is initially 
assigned the payoff matrix set out in Table 6(a). In this game, it is supposed that our 








It is easy to see that the Table 6(a) game corresponds to the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” The 
dominant strategy is HC18. That is, when the players encounter each other randomly in a 
game played in accordance with Table 6(a), all of the players chose HC, and this choice 
becomes the evolutionarily stable strategy. Therefore, based on the historical initial 
condition of this society, HC is institutionalized. Incidentally, an evolutionarily stable 
strategy is the dominant strategy in a particular society19. If a minority group of players who 
behave in a different way invade a society that has an evolutionarily stable strategy, their 
low fitness prevents them from producing offspring (i.e. they are unable to grow to become 
a powerful force).  
Let us then say that the strategy conditions change and the payoff matrix changes from 
Table 6(a) to Table 6(b). Conditions change in that a player’s payoff for choosing HC when 
their opponent chose FV falls from 3 to 0. Following such a change, the game converges as 
a pure coordination game with two Nash equilibria of (FV,FV) and (HC,HC). However, as 
mentioned above, the historical initial condition in this society stipulates choosing HC as a 
social rule. Even if the above change in the environment occurs, as long as the other players 
continue to choose HC, the best response dynamics for each player remains HC, as “inertia” 
and “myopia” interact in the players’ rule choices. 
In a game based on Table 6(b), the payoff is (2,2) for (FV,FV) and (1,1) for (HC,HC). 
This means that (FV,FV) Pareto dominates (HC,HC). Nevertheless, this society continues to 
choose the Pareto-inferior institution, (HC,HC), as this is stipulated by the historical initial 
     Table 8-6(a) 
 FV HC 
FV 2,2 0,3 
HC 3,0 1,1 
     Table 8-6(b) 
 FV HC 
FV 2,2 0,0 
HC 0,0 1,1 
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condition. In CIA, this kind of situation is known as “coordination failure,” and resolving 
this failure enables institutions to evolve. 
 
6.3. Application of the game situation to accounting 
 
In this section, I will attempt a more concrete discussion of the mechanism behind 
institutional evolution by applying the above game situation to accounting problems. 
Let us say that HC refers to historical cost accounting and FV to fair value accounting. 
The game situation as per Table 6(a) is stipulated in the historical initial condition and 
shows a society where historical cost accounting has taken hold as an institution. This 
model could broadly apply to the U.S. until the mid-1980s and to Japan until the 1990s. In a 
society of this nature, the features of historical cost accounting, which are its measurement 
of “exactness and objectivity” (Werntz, 1962, p. 81), “verifiability” (AAA, 1966, p. 28), and 
“hardness” (Ijiri, 1975, p. 35), fall in line with the function expected of accounting, which is 
what makes it the dominant strategy. In other words, all other conditions being equal, 
historical cost information is more useful than fair value information because it has the 
aforementioned attributes, and it therefore follows that those who choose historical cost 
accounting will be rewarded with a relatively higher payoff than those who choose fair 
value accounting. In a society where choosing historical cost accounting has been 
established as an evolutionarily stable strategy, historical cost accounting reigns supreme as 
an overwhelmingly dominant species that literally forbids the reproduction of other species. 
That said, the Table 6(a) game situation suggests that the accounting environment has 
already become unsettled. That is, a strategy combination (FV,FV) exists that offers a payoff 
of 2, which is greater than the payoff of 1 associated with the Nash equilibrium (HC,HC). 
This kind of situation arises when people’s expectations of accounting change with the 
financialization and informatization of the economy. However, breaking away from the 
evolutionarily stable rule of historical cost accounting will have a considerably negative 
effect on the payoff (including the political cost associated with a non-dominant species 
being a heretic, in addition to the cost of changing strategy), and the dominant 
players—those who chose historical cost accounting—will unilaterally benefit. This is why, 
in a game situation based on Table 6(a), historical cost accounting will continue to be 
chosen as a legitimate rule. 
Yet with time, the game situation changes from Table 6(a) to Table 6(b). In concrete 
terms, this change shows that the relative cost of breaking away from historical cost 
accounting has fallen. That is, the economic agents won’t see a unilateral reduction in their 
payoffs even if they break away from historical cost accounting; rather, they will receive the 
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same treatment (payoff of 0) as those who choose historical cost accounting do. Further, this 
kind of change occurs when the social resistance to breaking away from historical cost 
accounting decreases with the increasing financialization and informatization of the 
economy, and more emphasis is given to the comparability of accounting information in 
circulation. In other words, in such a situation, there will be no payoff unless the economic 
agents share the comparable information, be it historical cost information or fair value 
information.   
As a result of this change, the game will converge as a pure coordination game, with the 
social rule becoming either historical cost accounting or fair value accounting. As 
mentioned above, in such a society, the historical initial condition stipulates choosing 
historical cost accounting as the traditional rule. Even if the aforementioned environmental 
change occurs, as long as the other economic agents continue to choose historical cost 
accounting, historical cost accounting will remain the best response for all economic agents 
since “inertia” and “myopia” interact in their choice of rules. Theoretically, resolving this 
“coordination failure” will enable the institutional evolution of accounting.  
 
6.4. A closer examination of real-world accounting problems 
 
Before investigating how to resolve the “coordination failure,” I would like to build on 
the discussion above and take an even closer look at real-world accounting problems. 
It is commonly accepted that accounting in the U.S. in recent years has been extremely 
strongly oriented towards fair value accounting. The issue of consolidating profit as 
comprehensive income that was discussed in section 3.2 is a symbolic indication of this. By 
applying EGT terminology, we might say that fair value accounting is in the process of 
becoming the evolutionarily stable strategy in rule formation in the U.S. today. However, it 
was not actually that long ago that fair value accounting acquired this kind of status in the 
U.S. 
R.R. Sterling20, who is known to be a proponent of current value accounting, recalled 
(below) how his proposal for accounting recognition based on “representational 
faithfulness” when the Conceptual Framework Project (specifically, during the 
establishment of SFAC No. 5) was rejected by the FASB. Even if his rather extreme rhetoric 
is best taken with a pinch of salt, we can still get a sense of the ideological situation in the 
U.S. accounting sector during the mid-1980s; his comments show that fair value accounting 
was still very much seen as a heretical social rule.  
  
Paradoxically, the rejection of current values by some FASB members resulted in their 
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rejection of my proposals not to adopt current values. The obstacle became clear to me 
when in a formal, public FASB meeting one member said to another: “Just as I see a 
communist beneath every bush, I see current values beneath his every word.” That 
brought back memories of McCarthy’s logic that one’s denial of being a communist spy 
was taken as evidence that one was a communist spy because a communist spy would 
deny that he is a communist spy. It was then that I realized that my denials were to no 
avail, that no matter how many times I said I was not proposing current values, some 
would see my efforts as attempts to lead them down a primrose path. (Sterling, 1985, 
preface) 
 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 5 (1984) actually reads: 
“[r]ather than attempt to select a single attribute and force changes in practice so that all 
classes of assets and liabilities use that attribute, this Concepts Statement suggests that use 
of different attributes will continue, and discusses how the Board may select the appropriate 
attribute in particular cases” (SFAC, No. 5, para.70). This would support R.R. Sterling’s 
comments.  
 
However, later, as we move into the 1990s and see the further financialization and 
informatization of the economy, a series of accounting standards were implemented that 
were oriented towards fair value accounting. Examples include “Accounting for Certain 
Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, FAS115, 1993” and “Reporting Comprehensive 
Income, FAS130, 1997.” By 2000, SFAC No. 7 was announced, which presented a general 
principle relating to the use of present value. It is safe to say that the sense of resistance in 
U.S. accounting to fair value accounting of which R.R. Sterling had spoken had basically 
disappeared in the process. 
However, the institutional evolution from historical cost accounting to fair value 
accounting was far from smooth. As we saw in section 3.2, archival studies almost 
consistently reported that comprehensive income—as an aggregate value of fair value 
information—was not found to have greater value relevance than net income. In other 
words, although the FASB had identified fair value information, particularly its aggregate 
value of comprehensive income, as useful, market participants decided not to use it over net 
income in practice and are basically still not making use of it today. By applying EGT 
terminology, we can say that choosing fair value accounting has not yet taken hold in U.S. 
society as an evolutionarily stable strategy. Further, if we suppose that U.S. society is based 




6.5. Conditions for breaking away from a Pareto-inferior state 
 
In this section, I would like to return to the analysis in section 6.2 in order to investigate 
the conditions necessary for breaking away from a Pareto-inferior state and thus resolving 
the “coordination failure.” 
In a Table 6(b) game situation, let us say that the proportion of players choosing FV is p 
and that the payoff for choosing FV is EUFV, and the payoff for choosing HC is EUHC. This 
gives the following: 
EUFV＝2p 
EUHC＝1－p 
It follows therefore that the condition for breaking away from a Pareto-inferior state is: 
EUFV－EUHC＝2p－(1－p)＞0 
That is, p＞1/3 
In other words, if more than one in three players choose FV, this society will resolve its 
“coordination failure” and break away from its Pareto-inferior state. However, as we can see 
from Table 6(b), this condition applies when the payoff for (FV,FV) is double that for 
(HC,HC). If the payoff difference increases, for example if the payoff for (FV,FV) is (3,3) 
while for (HC,HC) is (1,1), the necessary condition becomes p > 1/4. That is, as the new 
Nash equilibrium payoff increases in relative terms, the proportion of players who need to 
make the choice that will promote institutional evolution decreases (institutional evolution 
can be realized more easily and in a shorter time). 
Conceivable policies to create a situation that would meet the aforementioned 
conditions include: (1) systematically cultivate players (players with new genes) who will 
seek to acquire a higher payoff by choosing FV; (2) use government intervention to 
encourage players to choose FV rather than HC by implementing policies to increase the 
difference between payoffs for (FV,FV) and (HC,HC); (3) promote direct contact or 
exchange with societies where FV is the evolutionarily stable strategy21. In the field of 
accounting, any one of these policies would mean taking stronger measures to ensure that 
compiling and disclosing fair value information is the benchmark in accounting practice and 
rulemaking.  
The previously addressed topic of the FASB and IASB’s Joint Project of Financial 
Performance Reporting by Business Enterprises (retaining the possibility for profit to be 
consolidated as comprehensive income) could be counted as an example of such policies. It 
is also highly likely that the following examples (not addressed in this paper) are linked to 
such policies: the FASB’s Project of Fair Value Measurement that was launched in 2003 
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(FASB, 2006a) and the FASB and IASB’s Joint Project of Conceptual Framework that was 
launched in 2004 (FASB, 2006b). In other words, it appears that some policies that promote 
the institutional evolution of accounting have already been implemented. If this is the case, 
it may simply be a matter of time before U.S. society, and maybe the global society as well, 
resolves its “coordination failure” and breaks away from its Pareto-inferior state. In fact, 
some recent archival studies—albeit in very small numbers—have presented empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that comprehensive income is more value-relevant than net income 
(e.g., Hirst et al. 2001; Biddle and Choi, 2002; Ide, 2004).  
 
6.6. Noteworthy points  
 
Several points that should be considered are highlighted in this paper. I would like to 
identify the points considered particularly important in understanding the nature of 
institutional evolution in accounting. 
First, in this paper, the investigation was carried out under the assumption that while the 
rulemakers understand the “true” game situation surrounding the choice of rules, the 
boundedly rational market participants do not, which generates an equilibrium that does not 
fit with the “true” game situation. Until section 4, it was assumed that market participants 
considered the empirical evidence generated by the market as basic facts and that the 
rulemakers were setting rules that did not fit with these facts. The fact that the rulemakers 
believed that their understanding of the game situation was the true one is a problem at the 
level of belief. Considering this point, the assumptions in the later sections are no different 
to those prior to section 4. The later sections differ from section 4 in that they assume that 
the game situation that rulemakers believe to be true does indeed correspond to the true 
game situation. We altered our assumption in this way because otherwise we would not 
have been able to derive, with logical consistency, the possibilities for institutional 
evolution from the currently observable empirical facts and accounting phenomena. If this 
assumption were to show major signs of collapse, the investigation in this paper would, of 
course, lose its explanatory power. Such limitations are therefore inherent to the 
investigation in this paper. 
Secondly, this paper investigates the process of institutional evolution for protecting the 
markets, taking the U.S. belief in protecting the markets as a given. In other words, the topic 
referred to—historical cost accounting vs fair value accounting—was positioned as an 
institutional tool to protect the markets. From the 1920s through to the 1940s, the 
calculational framework of U.S. accounting underwent a fundamental transition from 
current (fair) value accounting to historical cost accounting. Therefore, purely based on the 
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relationship between fair value accounting and historical cost accounting, we could also see 
the changes that occurred from the 1990s onwards as nothing but an institutional change in 
the opposite direction (Saito, 2003, p. 35). “Evolution” is different to “development.” 
Institutions are always “evolving” as they come to include new kinds of elements, but this 
evolution does not necessarily mean that it is “developing” from a lower level to a higher 
one. The investigation in this paper is based on this view of history. 
 
7. Conclusion: implications for accounting research 
 
I believe that I have so far largely achieved the aim of this paper, which was to 
demonstrate the formation process of accounting institutions and the possibilities for them 
to evolve, based on the concept and approach of CIA. 
If the formation process of accounting institutions and the possibilities for their 
evolution are as described in this paper, where does this leave the raison d’être of 
accounting research and archival studies in particular? This question addresses the 
implications of this paper for accounting research. I would like to conclude by giving a 
tentative answer.  
Regardless of whether it is the rulemakers or the market participants who are the more 
rational party, it is an indisputable fact that archival studies have shown that recent 
rulemaking has often not been in keeping with empirical evidence. In other words, with the 
exception of a very small number of cases (e.g., abolition of FAS33), the chain of events 
involving empirical evidence → rule setting/revision → value relevance improvement has 
not existed in reality. 
What, then, is the relationship between rulemaking and value relevance? In light of the 
investigation so far, one possible hypothesis would be that a chain exists between 
rulemaking and value relevance in the form of: rule setting → market participants learn 
about the rule → value relevance is generated. In other words, the absence or presence of 
value relevance is not the guideline for rulemaking but the result of it. Further, mediating 
between rulemaking and value relevance is the market participants learning about the rule. 
As market participants become more acquainted with the new rule, understanding of the 
accounting information that is supplied under this rule becomes institutionalized. As a result, 
value relevance is generated for this information (the systematic relationship between 
accounting information and market participant behavior).  
For example, Usui (2005) studied a sample of Japanese companies to analyze the value 
relevance of pseudo comprehensive income 22  and found that pseudo comprehensive 
income—aggregated from both individual and consolidated statements—had only 
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extremely low incremental information value, but that the individual items of pseudo other 
comprehensive income (difference in revaluation of land under the Act on Revaluation of 
Land, unrealized gains and losses from available-for-sale securities, and foreign currency 
translation adjustments) had a higher incremental information value than the aggregate 
value of pseudo comprehensive income. If we refer to the aforementioned hypothesis, one 
reason behind the difference in value relevance may be that while Japan already has 
disclosure rules for the individual items of pseudo other comprehensive income, and 
therefore, market participants already have some understanding of each type of information, 
there are no disclosure rules for the aggregate value of pseudo comprehensive income, 
which means that market participants have not been able to gain an understanding of this 
information. 
This is just a tentative interpretation, but focusing on this kind of aspect may suggest 
that the social raison d’être of archival studies lies in sending signals (information 
suggesting how strategy distribution has changed in the game) to the market regarding the 
status of or trends in institutional changes and thus promoting (or hindering) changes in the 
behavioral patterns of market participants, by providing an ex post account of how the 
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*This paper is a revised edition of Chapter 7 of Accounting in the Era of Institutional Change, 2007, 
Chuokeizai Publisher (in Japanese), and “An Institutional Theory Perspective on Accounting 
Evolution: Rulemakers’ Belief and Empirical Evidence,” in D. Bensadon and N. Praquin (eds.), 
IFRS in a Global Wold: International and Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2016, Springer, 
pp.41-56. It contains a lot of additional analyses and discussions on the original. 
1 Please refer to Aoki (2001) for a basic theoretical overview of CIA. 
2 In this paper, the term “archival studies” is used to mean studies where the main analytical 
method applied is statistical analysis of archival data. As shown in Table 1, archival studies have 
come to constitute an important trend in accounting research in recent years. They are also 
referred to as “empirical studies.” 
3 The asset/liability view was presented in FASB (1976) as a view of accounting that should be 
chosen as a foundation for standards setting. 
4 By contrast, Frankel et al. (2002) reported a positive correlation between remuneration from 
non-audit services and discretionary accruals. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Larcker and 
Richardson (2004) later implemented an ex post verification of the empirical findings in Frankel 
et al. (2002) and identified inherent problems with the research design. 
5 The “Big Eight” at the time were the following eight accounting firms: Arthur Andersen & Co. 
(Chicago); Ernst & Ernst (Cleveland); Haskins & Sells (New York); Coopers & Lybrand (New 
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York); Peat, Marwick, Michell & Co. (New York); Price Waterhouse & Co. (New York); Touche 
Ross & Co. (New York); and Arthur Young & Co. (New York). 
6 I used the term “tentative” here because the observation is inferred on the basis of collateral 
evidence. The conclusion may change in light of additional collateral evidence. It is impossible 
to find direct proof with this type of issue.  
7 On this point, please refer to Watts and Zimmerman (1979, p. 297), for example: “[t]he 
dominance of the information objective arose, we suspect, as a public interest justification 
consistent with and in support of the raison d’être of the Securities Acts. The SEC was justified 
in terms of, and charged with, maintaining the orderly functioning of the capital markets. In 
particular, the SEC was to protect the public from another stock market crash. That crash was 
alleged to have been caused in part by inadequate corporate disclosure, although very little 
evidence exists to support this claim.”  
8 This process is termed “isomorphism.” Isomorphism is a term used in new institutional 
sociology to mean “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell [1983], p. 149). 
In other words, the theoretical implications of isomorphism are that a given organization has to 
incorporate the rules that dominate in its field and isomorph itself into a dominating 
organization in order to win public confidence and continue to stably exist in that field 
(Covaleski et al. [1993] p. 66). This is the process whereby an organization acquires legitimacy 
in a society.  
9 This regulation, which was aimed at strengthening the independence and status of auditors, 
was later strengthened further through the partial amendment of the Certified Public 
Accountants Act. 
10 Please refer to Aoki (2001, pp.14-15) for a discussion of infinite regression. 
11 This differs from assumptions in neoclassical economics in that real economic agents are 
considered to possess limited rationality because of their restricted cognitive ability. This is 
referred to as “bounded rationality.” 
12 A. Downs coined the term “rational ignorance” to mean that if the relative cost of acquiring 
additional information is greater than the benefits it will bring, it is rational—in terms of the 
economic benefit—for citizens to remain “ignorant.” Please refer to Oishi (1995, p. 124) for a 
more detailed explanation. 
13 “Strategic complementarity” means that as a certain behavioral pattern becomes universal in 
a society, choosing this pattern will become an increasingly advantageous choice for each 
economic agent. 
14 “Random matching” refers to a situation whereby a player’s opponents are unknown prior to 
the game and are selected at random from the remaining components of the society. 
15 In an N-person non-cooperative game, the players’ set of strategies s*=（s1*,…, sn*）is said to 
be in a Nash equilibrium when strategy si* is the best response for all players i（= 1,…, n）to the 
other players’ set of strategies, s－i*=（s1*,…, si-1*, si+1*,sn*）.  
16 Positing these three hypotheses makes EGT highly beneficial, as it allows us to simplify the 
mathematical model without sacrificing the reality of the game situation. 
17 The following description of the EGT game situation is informed by Okuno & Takizawa 
(1996).  
18 The game known as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” is a non-cooperative non-zero-sum game. 
Regardless of the fact that in Table 6(a) the players would be rewarded with higher payoffs if 
they cooperated, they are unable to do this and choose the Pareto-inferior option (HC,HC). In 
terms of real accounting problems, let us look at the cases of players choosing the heretic social 
rule of FV: even if they are allowed to communicate and come to an agreement beforehand, 
players are unable to build a relationship of trust and a cooperative game does not take place. 
19 Please refer to Okuno and Takizawa (1996, pp. 283-286) for a mathematical definition of an 
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“evolutionarily stable strategy.” 
20 One of the features of the current value accounting that R.R. Sterling was proposing was the 
emphasis on accounting statements being a so-called “faithful representation” of economic 
phenomena. 
21 (3) applies to the Japanese catch-up model of institutional evolution. Please refer to Okuno 
and Takizawa (1996, pp. 288-293) for the EGT implications of such policies. 
22 In Japan, it was not compulsory to disclose comprehensive income up until 2011. Therefore, 
in order to investigate the value relevance of comprehensive income on the Japanese market 
prior to this, it was necessary to generate an estimated comprehensive income by adding up the 
items corresponding to comprehensive income from within the disclosed information. This 
figure is known as pseudo comprehensive income. 
